The nature of economic espionage


Based on all articles which I posted until now, I find that economic or industrial espionage commonly occurs in one of two ways. Firstly, a dissatisfied employee spread information to damage the company or, secondly, a competitor or foreign government seeks information for its own interest. Persons who work within an organization and secretly pass important information to another organization or country are generally believed the best sources for economic or industrial espionage. It is a fact that insiders can be encouraged or eagerly provide information for the others. In the other hand, individuals may leave one company to take up employment with another and take sensitive information with them which have resulted in legal battles between giants companies. In recent years, some countries hire individuals to do spying rather than make use of their own agents. The interesting point in my mind is that spy basically is anyone who has legal access to the premises and can use it illegally like software engineer, academics, a maintenance man, a cleaner and etc.

I read an article that said in Japan students are often thought to be utilized by governments in gathering information have been and expect students be debriefed on returning home.

Computers due to the ease of access to large amounts of information, through physical contact or via the internet have made these process and bringing new concepts of crime.

Cyber Espionage: A Growing Threat to Business


Cyber espionage is getting renewed attention as fresh evidence emerges of online break-ins at U.S. research labs and targeted phishing against corporations and government agencies here and abroad.

It's no wonder that research firm Sans Institude has ranked cyber espionage No. 3 on its "Top Ten Cyber Menaces for 2008," just behind Web site attacks exploiting browser vulnerabilities and botnets such as the infamous Storm.

"Economic espionage will be increasingly common as nation-states use cyber theft of data to gain economic advantage in multinational deals," SANS Institute claims. "The attack of choice involves targeted spear phishing with attachments, using well-researched social engineering methods to make the victim believe that an attachment comes from a trusted source."

Alan Paller, director of research at SANS Institute, adds that people should be aware that an "extraordinary treasure chest of information has been stolen," and "the same people doing the military espionage are engaged in economic espionage using the same or very similar techniques to steal information from organizations that are working on business ventures in the attackers' country." He offered no estimate as to how much cyber espionage is costing organizations.

Many have seen some form of cyber espionage up close.

"Absolutely there's espionage," says Michele Stewart, manager of data security at Orlando-based Ait Tran Airways.

Members of AirTran's executive management team were recently targeted by phishing e-mail that sought to trick them into divulging confidential corporate information as well as attempted to place bot malware on their computers, she says.

"The e-mail did get through our filter, but fortunately [our team] had the presence of mind to realize something strange was going on," Stewart says. AirTran, which relies on Lancope network-behavior-analysis equipment to watch for anything outside the norm and conducts awareness training with employees, doesn't know who was targeting it, she says.

Separately, the U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) last month acknowledged that about a dozen staff members fell for phony e-mail urging them to go to phishing sites or open attachments with malware.

Hackers not only infiltrated the ORNL network, accessing some nonclassified databases, but director Thom Mason told employees (via an e-mail message, ironically enough) it was all part of a "sophisticated cyber attack that now appears to be part of a coordinated attempt to gain access to computer networks at numerous laboratories and other institutions across the country."

ORNL has officially declined to say more. But some security researchers close to the matter say investigations now point to China.

"I work with the FBI as president of the InfraGard Philadelphia chapter, and the FBI thinks IP addresses link this to China," says Tom Bowers, senior security evangelist at Kaspersky Lab, referring to the FBI-industry collaboration called InfraGard. The FBI itself wouldn't comment on the matter.

In Great Britain, too, the threat of cyber espionage is being raised by the British Security Service MI5, which has warned hundreds of banks and legal firms there that they are under electronic espionage attack by Chinese state organizations -- a claim angrily refuted by China, which says it's under attack itself by hackers

Cracking Crimes

Many security experts are quick to point out that just because an attack might be traced to any server in any country doesn't provide direct evidence of much since attackers may simply be controlling the servers from almost anywhere in the world.

"The issue is not just who did it, it's that China is not actively trying to stop bad guys," says Gartner analystJohn Pescatore, who thinks government-funded cyber espionage is minimal in comparison to that carried out by criminals motivated to steal information for financial gain.

"Industrial espionage is not primarily for intellectual property; it's more for your customers' personal information," he says.

Salesforce.com, Pescatore notes, last month disclosed a data breach in which one of its salespeople got hit with malware on a PC that was able to harvest customers' e-mail.

"The clever thing when you go after a salesperson is that they have a lot of contact and personal information about people," Pescatore says. "They e-mail to these people quite a bit."

The goal in corporate espionage is not just to grab sensitive corporate data but corporate credit card information with large credit limits and usage patterns outside the country that might not be noticed, Pescatore says.

In the Saleforce.com incident, the company started to get reports from customers about suspicious e-mail with fake documents that looked like they were coming from legitimate Salesforce.com sources but were actually phishing attempts. The company told Pescatore it thinks the attack had been ongoing since June.

The possibility that online espionage might occur is a concern for those who outsource IT functions as well.

"One reason we use the back-up service we do is because the data is not identified by financial institution on their end," says Joe Sinkovits, vice president of operations and compliance officer at Illinois-based Lisle Savings Bank. "There will always be a problem with espionage -- it's always a real possibility. F-Secure, which makes antimalware software, says its customers are discovering troubling indications that their networks have been targeted.

"We have a tool called Blacklight that discovers rootkits which are used to hide other files," says Patrik Runald, F-Secure's security response manager. "The rootkit intercepts communications between the security software and Windows. People using our tools all over the world, especially in manufacturing or defense, find these rootkits are opening up back doors and sending data to China. When we check in some of these cases, the rootkit has been there for months."

Runald adds it doesn't mean the perpetrators are from China, simply that the communications are to China. In contrast, most of the "bulk malware" targeting consumers, such as bank Trojans, seems to be associated with Russia and Eastern Europe, he says.

In one example of targeted corporate espionage that F-Secure saw recently, one company's human resources director was the victim of an infected e-mail attachment falsely posing as a résumé document for a position posted on the company's Web site. "The H.R. person is the contact, and it was about tricking him," Runald says.

Runald points out that the rise of social networking sites such as Linkedln and Facebook is unfortunately giving attackers additional means to find out more about business relationships in order to exploit them for purposes of espionage.

The term "open source espionage" describes the process of gathering information through readily available posted information, says Nick Selby , director of the enterprise security practice at The 451 Group.

These days, that could be LinkedIn, Facebook, MySpace or scouring Google searches for corporate info mistakenly left exposed to the public, he points out. And it's known that some companies have put some servers out on the Internet simply to try and sniff another company's unencrypted traffic.

Tim Mather, chief security strategist for the RSA Conference Advisory Board, says worries over online espionage may be overblown. But he does believe that open source intelligence gathering is big, with companies as diverse as Aegis Defence Services and Concentric Solutions International available for hire to scour every nook and cranny of the online world for desired information.

"These kinds of companies might be trolling chat sites, anywhere, to find out something," says Mather. "It's a growth industry."

How to Defend Yourself

To lower risks associated with cyber espionage, taking steps such as deploying data-leak prevention products to watch what data leaves the organization as well as database-monitoring tools and appropriate access controls may be a good idea. Selby suggests that classifying data as public or confidential is often desirable. But the main problem for corporations, he says, is that all too often they simply can't answer the question "Where is the data coming from? They just don't know."

Some companies are taking an even more drastic approach.

Paul Kocher, president of Cryptography Research, which provides specialized security and product-design analysis to its business and government clientele, says his firm is so wary of cyber espionage that it maintains two separate networks.

"We run one for the Internet and e-mail, and another just for internal communications," Kocher says. "Everyone has two computers under their desk. We buy twice as much software. It is inconvenient and it doubles out IT budget. We do this to protect our customers. We're a logical target.[1]



[1] By Ellen Messmer, NetworkWorld.

http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/141474/cyber_espionage_a_growing_threat_to_business.html

A TOOL FOR FIGHTING ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: Federal Law Criminalizes Misappropriation of Trade Secrets



The Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39, gives companies another tool in the fight against misappropriation of trade secrets to "adopt a national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic information" and to combat the rising tide of espionage against and threats to corporate trade secrets. It criminalizes misappropriation of trade secrets.

The EEA creates a crime for the misappropriation of a trade secret to the economic benefit of anyone other than the trade secret owner generally, or specifically a foreign government. For example, in June 2008, a former Chinese national who admitted he tried to sell fighter pilot training software to the Chinese navy was sentenced to two years in prison. See United States v. Meng, No. 04-CR-20216, slip. op. (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2008). The EEA also prohibits "attempts" and "conspiracies" to commit economic espionage.

The standard definitions of trade secrets apply, as do the rules that the owner must have taken measures to keep the information secret, and the information must derive independent economic value from not being known and not being readily ascertainable through proper means.

The penalties that may be imposed under the EEA are severe. An individual convicted of theft of a trade secret under this statute for economic espionage with a foreign government, instrumentality or agent faces a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison and/or a fine up to $500,000. A corporation or other organization held in violation of foreign espionage is subject to a maximum fine of $10 million. In cases of trade secret conversion in interstate or foreign commerce for economic benefit, a person faces a fine and/or 10 years in prison, and a corporation can be fined up to $5 million.

Special Features

The EEA requires the court to enter orders to preserve the confidentiality of the trade secret in any proceeding under the act. Without that, the owner of a trade secret may be reluctant to cooperate in an EEA prosecution for fear of exposing the trade secret to public view.

Additionally, the EEA provides for criminal forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly," from the theft of the trade secret. Additionally, "any of the person's [or organization's] property used . . . to commit or facilitate the commission [of the offense]" may also be forfeited. Although the property is forfeited to the United States, the victim should seek restitution from the proceeds of the forfeiture.

If a party resides in the United States, but commits the act of espionage in a foreign country, that act of espionage is subject to the EEA . Also, if a foreign corporation sells a product containing a trade secret in the United States, it may be prosecuted under the EEA as long as the misappropriation occurred in the United States.

The trade secret owner must weigh the benefits and risks of a prosecution before requesting the government to commence a case. For example, a prosecution shows competitors that the owner of the trade secret is serious about protecting its proprietary and confidential information. Conversely, in an EEA prosecution, the owner of the trade secret loses control of the case to the government, which may not have the same interests. Additionally, the criminal defendant may be entitled to production of the trade secret as part of discovery, subject to a court protective order preserving confidentiality.

Because the trade secret owner relies on the U.S. attorney's office's willingness to prosecute, it is important to consider the questions that the government may ask in deciding whether to commence a case under the EEA. First, what was the adequacy of the security measures? Second, what kind of information was misappropriated? It is likely that the government will be more interested in pursuing a case involving scientific or research information because it may have longer lasting value. (A marketing plan may have no value by the time a case proceeds to trial.)

Third, is there hard evidence of misappropriation, particularly physical evidence or admissions? Fourth, is the trade secret owner willing to cooperate fully with the government? Fifth, does the defendant have a strong defense to the action? Sixth, what is the timing of the referral? In some cases, it may be better to report the theft immediately, while in other instances it may be wise to conduct a full, private investigation before contacting the U.S. attorney's office. Seventh, does the trade secret have value and can it be documented? Finally, does the victim have the resources to pursue a civil remedy?

Defenses

A defendant to an action brought under the EEA has the three traditional defenses used in trade secret actions: (1) independent parallel development of the trade secret; (2) reverse engineering; and (3) general knowledge, skills or experience. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1998).

Representative Cases

In United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2002), the defendant's conviction under the EEA was upheld over his denial that the computer data he stole from his former employer and attempted to sell to a competitor met the statutory definition of "trade secret." The court held that the former employer took reasonable measures to keep the computer data secret, including storing all of the data in a room protected by a special lock, alarm system, motion detector; keeping the number of copies and employees' access thereto limited; and dividing its work among several vendors to ensure that no vendor could replicate the product. See also United States v. Four Pillars Enterprise Co., No. 06-3297, 2007 WL 3244034 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2007) (The defendant was convicted of attempt and conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets in violation of the EEA for scheme to obtain confidential and proprietary information from employer).[1]



Reference:

[1]http://www.tradesecretsnoncompetelaw.com/2009/05/articles/trade-secrets/a-tool-for-fighting-economic-espionage-federal-law-criminalizes-misappropriation-of-trade-secrets/

PWC warns of cyber-espionage risks


According to a new report from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Inc., cyber-espionage is a growing problem and is no longer restricted to governments and large international companies.

"There is an elevated risk, even for smaller companies, that they may become a potential target," said William Beer, a director in PWC's risk assurance services group and co-author of the report.

While not coming up with any new evidence to support the claims, the report assembles recent material from a number of sources to indicate what it sees as a growing danger.

For instance, it mentions that in late 2007, the head of MI5, the London-based security intelligence agency, sent a confidential letter to 300 U.K. business leaders at banks, accountants and legal firms, warning them of a coordinated, Web-based cyber-espionage campaign against the U.K. economy.

The report also cited that in November 2008, the U.K. Cabinet Office published the first National Risk Register, showing the likelihood and impact of various threats, from flu pandemics to attacks on crowded places. Included in the list was the risk of electronic attacks, which were seen as highly likely to occur, although of lower impact to the country as a whole.

The PWC cyber-espionage, or e-espionage, research also pointed out a March 2009 report from the University of Cambridge called "The Snooping Dragon: Social-malware Surveillance of the Tibetan Movement," which concluded: "What Chinese spooks did in 2008, Russian crooks will do in 2010, and even low-budget criminals from less developed countries will follow in due course," referring to possible external social-malware attacks that could allow malicious hackers to spy on users' machines.

The 'snooping dragon' report also warned: "Social malware [using email lures to get people to visit bogus websites that serve malicious code] is unlikely to remain a tool of governments. Certainly organisations of interest to governments should take proper precautions now, but other firms had better start to think about what it will mean for them when social-malware attacks become widespread."

In early 2009, the Canada-based research project, Information Warfare Monitor, published a report titled "Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network," which detailed the findings of a 10-month investigation into a global electronic spy network that had infiltrated computers in various government offices around the world. The report said the network used malware to compromise 1,295 computers in 103 countries, including systems belonging to foreign ministries and embassies and those linked with the Dalai Lama.

PWC's Beer said senior management needs to take security more seriously, especially since the rise in espionage coincides with a general rise in fraud caused by the economic downturn.

"Part of the challenge is that whenever senior managers hear about anything with 'cyber' or 'e' in it, they see it as an IT problem and delegate down," he said. "It requires more focus and a wider approach than just IT. Technology is the instrument that is used, but we need much better governance to try to provide a better assurance that these problems are not going to occur."

Beer said that in PWC's latest global research into security awareness, which questioned 7,000 senior management from 119 countries, 35% admitted they had no idea how many security incidents had occurred in their own organisations.

PWC has compiled a checklist of questions to help companies assess and tackle e-espionage risks:

  1. Do you know the scale, number, nature and source of the incidents you have suffered to date?
  2. Have you clearly identified your business's most valuable assets and which ones are most at risk from attack?
  3. What would be the business impact of information/assets being stolen or compromised?
  4. What is your strategy to manage, mitigate and minimise this risk?
  5. Do you discuss this risk with investors and in the Annual Report?
  6. What processes and technologies have you put in place to execute your security strategy?
  7. What investment are you making to put these in place and ensure they remain effective?
  8. How often do you reassess the risk and the strategy to manage it?
  9. What new threats to your business are emerging in the e-espionage arena?
  10. Have you educated and trained your staff to recognise and respond to the issue?[1]



Federal Judge Trashes Novel Economic Espionage Case


A jury already gave the government a gut shot in its high profile espionage prosecution against two Silicon Valley engineers.

On Friday, Northern District of California Judge James Ware fired one right into the heart of the case, throwing out two economic spying counts on which the jury had hung. The only charge remaining is for trade secret theft.

The Justice Department has been vocal about blocking technology leaks to foreign governments, especially China. So it bumped up trade secret charges against Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge to include economic espionage. It accused Ge and Lee of stealing trade secrets from their employer, NetLogic Microsystems, and trying to commercialize them with venture funding from the Chinese government.

The trial in 2009 lasted three weeks, and the jury deliberated for five days. On both counts which Ware directed an acquittal Friday, the jury had hung 9-3 in favor of innocence. On the trade secret count Ware kept in play, they had divided 6-6.

"The government must present evidence that defendants intended to confer a benefit on the [People's Republic of China], not receive a benefit from it," Ware wrote. "The court finds evidence that defendants intended to apply for a grant from the PRC is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that the government prove that the defendants intended to provide a benefit to the PRC, or one of its instrumentalities or agents."

Ware's ruling is not appealable. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Matthew Parella and Joseph Fazioli must now decide whether they want to retry the engineers on trade secret theft. The defendants were represented by Edward Swanson of Swanson & McNamara, and Thomas Nolan of Nolan, Armstrong & Barton.[1]




Reference:

[1]http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202458668065

Case: Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage in cyber space



WASHINGTON - Xiaodong Sheldon Meng, 44, a software engineer born in China and currently a resident of Cupertino, Calif., was sentenced today to a term of 24 months by the Honorable Jeremy Fogel, U.S. District Court Judge in San Jose and was also ordered to serve a three-year term of supervised release following his prison term; pay a fine of $10,000, and forfeit computer equipment seized in the case.

The sentence, the first handed down for a violation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 USC Section 1831), was announced by Patrick Rowan, Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Joseph P. Russoniello, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California; Arthur Cummings, Executive Assistant Director for the FBI’s National Security Branch; and Julie L. Myers, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

On August 1, 2007, Meng pleaded guilty to two national security violations: one count of violating the Economic Espionage Act and one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Meng’s conviction was the first involving military source code under the Arms Export Control Act and marked the second case in which there was a conviction under the Economic Espionage Act for misappropriating a trade secret with the intent to benefit a foreign government.

According to court records, Meng committed economic espionage by misappropriating a trade secret, known as "Mantis 1.5.5," from his former employer, Quantum3D Inc., with the intent to benefit a foreign government, specifically the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Navy Research Center in Beijing. He did so by using the Mantis 1.5.5 trade secret as part of a demonstration project in attempting to sell products of his new employer, Orad, Hi-Tec Systems Ltd., which was a direct competitor of Quantum3D. The trade secret at issue, known as "Mantis," is a Quantum3D product used to simulate real world motion for military training and other purposes.

In addition, Meng violated the Arms Export Control Act by knowingly and willfully exporting to the PRC a defense article on the United States Munitions List (defense article viXsen) without authorization from the United States. The product viXsen is a Quantum3D visual simulation software program used for training military fighter pilots who use night visual sensor equipment, including thermal imaging.

According to court documents, the investigation established that Meng had, in fact, misappropriated two defense articles (specifically nVSensor, in addition to viXsen described above), at least six source code products which were also trade secrets, and more than one hundred materials and utilities belonging to his former employer, Quantum3D. Many of these misappropriated Quantum3D products were intended primarily for military purposes. For example, nVSensor is a Quantum3D product used to provide night vision simulation and is exclusively used in military applications for precision training and simulation applications.

The investigation also established that defendant Meng was assisting in developing two separate military proposals for two separate Air Forces in Southeast Asia involving visual simulation equipment and source code. Copies of two F-16 Full Mission Simulator proposals involving two different countries were found on Meng’s laptop.

"Today’s case demonstrates the importance of safeguarding sensitive U.S. military technology as well as trade secrets. It should also serve as a warning to others who would compromise our national security for profit," said Patrick Rowan, Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security.

Mr. Rowan commended the teamwork of several agencies that worked on the case for nearly four years, including the U.S. Attorney’s Office Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Unit in the Northern District of California; the National Security Division and Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice; the FBI, and ICE, as well Customs & Border Protection. The Department of State and the Department of Defense also provided assistance on the case. The U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Northern District of Alabama, District of Minnesota, and Middle District of Florida also joined the plea agreement as some conduct in the case occurred in those jurisdictions.

Joseph P. Russoniello, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California, stated, "In this case, a Silicon Valley trade secret was used in a demonstration project in Beijing with the intent to benefit the PRC Naval Research Center. Source code for military visual simulation programs to train military fighter pilots and restricted defense articles were also willfully exported outside the United States. We will continue to enforce the criminal laws against those who violate export restrictions and misappropriate our trade secrets. Many of the systems we protect are designed to safeguard our men and women in harm’s way and compromising them significantly adds to the perils that they face in defending us. It is imperative that we vigilantly protect the intellectual property developed in the Silicon Valley and elsewhere in the country so as to maintain as our nation’s military defense advantages, and to deter acts of aggression against vital American interests."

"ICE is committed to shutting down those who are willing to put America’s national security on sale for a profit," said Julie L. Myers, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for ICE. "The export of U.S. military products and sensitive technology is controlled for good reason – in the wrong hands, these items could be used to harm America or its allies. Enforcing U.S. export laws is one of ICE’s top priorities, and we will continue to work with our partners in law enforcement and industry to ensure that those who put our country at risk are brought to justice."

FBI Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch, Arthur Cummings stated, "Protecting our nation’s most sensitive trade secrets and critical technology is at the core of the FBI mission. The FBI is committed to safeguard our country’s economic well-being and national security."

Quantum3D, Inc., based in San Jose, California, has cooperated fully in the government’s investigation. Quantum3D produces hardware and software components for simulation systems for commercial and military customers. Some of the products include high-end visual simulation systems, and interactive, open-architecture visual computing solutions, image generators, and embedded graphics subsystems.

Defendant Meng was ordered to surrender for this prison term on August 18, 2008. He has been out of custody after a $500,000 bond, secured by cash and real property, was posted at the beginning of the case.

The prosecution is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark L. Krotoski, presently on assignment at the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, with the assistance of Paralegal Lauri Gomez. Thomas P. Reilly, a Trial Attorney in the National Security Division’s Counterespionage Section, also assisted on the case. The case was investigated by a team of agents from the FBI and ICE.

Reference:http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-545.html

MI5 alert on China’s cyberspace spy threat


Exclusive:

Director-general of MI5 sends letter to British companies warning systems are under attack from China


The Government has openly accused China of carrying out state-sponsored espionage against vital parts of Britain’s economy, including the computer systems of big banks and financial services firms.

In an unprecedented alert, the Director-General of MI5 sent a confidential letter to 300 chief executives and security chiefs at banks, accountants and legal firms this week warning them that they were under attack from “Chinese state organisations”. It is believed to be the first time that the Government has directly accused China of involvement in web-based espionage. Such a blunt and explicit warning from Jonathan Evans could have serious diplomatic consequences and cast a shadow over Gordon Brown’s first official visit to China as Prime Minister early in the new year.

A summary of the MI5 warning, a copy of which has been seen by The Times, was posted on a secure government website. It says that Mr Evans wrote to business leaders “warning them of the electronic espionage attack”.

The summary, on the website of the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure, says: “The contents of the letter highlight the following: the Director-General’s concerns about the possible damage to UK business resulting from electronic attack sponsored by Chinese state organisations, and the fact that the attacks are designed to defeat best-practice IT security systems.”

It adds: “The letter acknowledges the strong economic and commercial reasons to do business with China, but the need to ensure management of the risks involved.”

Access to the site is limited to groups that form part of the country’s critical infrastructure, which include telecoms firms, banks and water and electricity companies. The document gives warning that British companies doing business in China are being targeted by the Chinese Army, which is using the internet to steal confidential commercial information. The Home Office refused to comment last night on what it called leaked private correspondence. A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in London said he was unaware of the allegations and that the embassy had not received any complaints from the British authorities.

Martin Jordan, a principal adviser at the accountants KPMG, who has seen the contents of the letter, said: “If the Chinese know that a British firm is trying to buy a company or other assets such as land in China then they are using every means at their disposal to discover details such as exactly how much money the British company is prepared to spend for that asset.”

Firms known to have been compromised recently by Chinese attacks are one of Europe’s largest engineering companies and a large oil company, The Times has learnt. Another source familiar with the MI5 warning said, however, that known attacks had not been limited to large firms based in the City of London. Law firms and other businesses in the regions that deal even with only small parts of Chinese-linked deals are being probed as potential weak spots, he said.

A security expert who has also seen the letter said that among the techniques used by Chinese groups were “custom Trojans”, software designed to hack into the network of a particular firm and feed back confidential data. The MI5 letter includes a list of known “signatures” that can be used to identify Chinese Trojans and a list of internet addresses known to have been used to launch attacks.

A big study gave warning this week that Government and military computer systems in Britain are coming under sustained attack from China and other countries. It followed a report presented to the US Congress last month describing Chinese espionage in the US as so extensive that it represented “the single greatest risk to the security of American technologies”.

Ian Brown, of Oxford University, one of the report’s authors, said that attacks traced back to China have been found attempting to crack Whitehall passwords. The report identified China as the country most active in internet-enabled spying operations and attacks but says that 120 other countries are using the same techniques.

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, one of several British bodies charged with protecting the country’s computer systems, has described the threat posed by cyber attacks as enormous.

Defence departments across the globe are already rewriting manuals for a future of digital warfare. The US has recorded 37,000 attempted breaches of government and private systems this year and a new unit at the US Air Force, staffed by 40,000 people, has been set up to prepare for cyber-war.

The Virtual Criminology Report found that attacks had progressed from initial curiosity probes to well-funded and well-organised operations for political, military, economic and technical espionage.[1]



Reference:

[1]http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/technology/article2980250.ece

Germany accuses China of industrial espionage


Germany is under attack from an increasing number of state-backed Chinese spying operations that are costing the German economy tens of billions of euros a year, a leading intelligence agent said.

Walter Opfermann, an espionage protection expert in the office for counter-intelligence for the state of Baden-Württemberg, said that China was using an array of "polished methods" from old-fashioned spies to phone-tapping, and increasingly the internet, to steal industrial secrets.

He said methods had become "extremely sophisticated" to the extent that China, which employs a million intelligence agents, was now capable of "sabotaging whole chunks of infrastructure" such as Germany's power grid. "This poses a danger not just for Germany but for critical infrastructure worldwide," he said.

Russia, he said, was also "top of the list" of states using internet spying techniques to garner vital German know-how which "helps save billions on their own economic research and development". He said while Russia only had "hundreds of thousands of agents", compared to China's million, it had "years more experience".

Opfermann estimated that German companies were losing around €50bn (£43bn) and 30,000 jobs to industrial espionage every year.

"China wants to be the world's leading economic power by 2020," Opfermann said. "For that they need a speedy and intensive transfer of high-level technological information which is available in developed industrial lands, if you can get your hands on it".

The areas most under attack include car manufacturing, renewable energies, chemistry, communication, optics, x-ray technology, machinery, materials research and armaments. Information being gathered was not just related to research and development but also management techniques and marketing strategies.

Opfermann said internet espionage was the biggest growth field, citing the "thick fog of Trojan email attacks" taking place against thousands of firms on a regular basis and the methods employed to cover up where the emails had come from.

But he said "old-fashioned" methods were also rife, such as phone-tapping, stealing laptops during business trips or Chinese companies who regularly sent spies to infiltrate companies.

"I cannot name names but we've dealt with several cases of Chinese citizens on work experience in German companies, who stole highly sensitive information from them," he said.

In one case, the police raided the house of a Chinese woman suspected of stealing company secrets from a German business where she was working, and discovered 170 CDs containing highly sensitive product details.

In a separate case a highly qualified Chinese mechanical engineer employed by a company in the Lake Constance region was discovered to have passed on information for a machine it was developing to the company's Chinese competitor, who constructed an exact copy.

"As is often the case the man disappeared and went back to China – so often the attacker is way ahead of the game and it's also hard to find out who they've been working for."

Opfermann said although the problem was "huge and growing", it was not being discussed, "because companies don't want to admit their weaknesses and lose customers and they don't want to ruin business opportunities with China. As a result we're only seeing the tip of the iceberg."

Two years ago the consultancy firm Corporate Trust estimated that around 20% of German companies – mainly small and middle-sized businesses – had been the victims of industrial espionage.The findings chime with fears across the industrial world about the threat of cyber crime and the corresponding increase in efforts being put in place to fight it.

In Britain last month the GCHQ, the government's electronic spy centre, which estimates that the UK loses GBP 1bn a year to e-fraud, set up operations to deal with the growing threats. The Pentagon also announced it is to create a new "cyber command" and in May President Obama said he would establish a White House role to oversee cyber defence, saying the nation's digital networks had to be recognised as a "strategic national asset".[1]






Reference:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/22/germany-china-industrial-espionage

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