Five Serious Cases of Cyber Espionage


Five recent cases of cyberespionage upon crucial governmental, infrastructure or political systems:

On Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal reported that unknown cyber-intruders had over the past two years hacked into defense-contractor servers housing information about the F-35, or Joint Strike Fighter, the next-generation fighter/bomber for the U.S., Britain and seven other close allies.

The hackers, whom all signs indicated were based in China, weren't able to get the most sensitive information because it's kept offline, but they did copy "several terabytes" — several thousand gigabytes — of data about the F-35's systems, internal maintenance and electronics.

In early April, unnamed government officials told the Wall Street Journal that cyberspies from China and Russia had broken into computer systems used by companies maintaining the three North American electrical grids.

Even worse, the spies had left behind software that could be used to disrupt the grids or take control of nuclear power plants. Chinese and Russian officials denied their governments were involved.

— Canadian researchers revealed in late March that a cyber-spy network based in China had broken into diplomatic computer systems involving 103 different countries. Beijing denied any official involvement, but the investigation had begun when the Dalai Lama, Tibet's leader-in-exile, noticed that sensitive documents from his own PCs had turned up in Chinese hands.

In another incident related to the spy network, a reporter who'd been e-mailing Tibetan exiles was warned off the case only hours later by Chinese officials.

— Just after Barack Obama's election victory in November, Newsweek revealed that both the Illinois senator's campaign and that of his rival, Sen. John McCain, had been spied upon by a foreign power that had placed spyware on staffers' computers.

The FBI and Secret Service contacted both campaigns over the summer with the news that either the Chinese or Russians had copied substantial amounts of information related to foreign policy; the McCain and Obama organizations quickly implemented security measures.

— For more than a year in 2001 and 2002, British hacker Gary McKinnon broke into nearly 100 U.S. military and NASA computers, purportedly seeking information about UFOs. The U.S. eventually figured out who he was and referred the case to Britain, where local authorities arrested him in 2002 but decided not to charge him.

The U.S. indicted him later that year and began extradition proceedings in 2005, which McKinnon has been fighting ever since. U.S. officials say McKinnon caused $700,000 worth of damages and deserves up to 70 years in prison; in Britain, he's become a cause celebre, with a recent diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome further compounding his victim status.[1]



[1]http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,517328,00.html

China’s expansion of economic espionage boils over


If you read Google's explanation about why it threatened to withdraw from China, you might think it's all about a recent Chinese cyber-attack and Google's anger over being made complicit in the persecution of human rights activists.

By cyber experts and China hands alike point to a much broader issue: The Chinese government has adapted the tactics it has used for military cyber espionage for corporate purposes and is now using them on a wide scale. Added to a fundamentally unfair business environment for foreign firms, the damaging effects of Chinese cyber spying may be scaring off firms like Google as they weigh the risks of operating there.

"The story is much bigger than the recent attack or concerns about human rights," said James Mulvenon, a preeminent expert and consultant on Chinese cyber activities, "It's becoming increasingly difficult for international companies to work and operate in China, particularly innovation firms."

As Google announced in its statement, many other firms are being targeted as well. The 34 firms discussed as part of Google's investigation into the attacks are mostly Silicon Valley technology firms who work with or in China, said Mulvenon. This is all part of the Chinese government's stated goal of aiding Chinese-owned firms using state power to cull information from that particular sector.

"The Chinese government has made it very clear they have a set of national champions and those champions should be promoted," he said.

Some China experts contend that Google, which has been operating in China since 2004, may be simply fed up with the Chinese government's pattern of allowing in foreign companies and then appropriating their technology for the benefit of Chinese competitors, in this case the rival search engine Baidu.

"They may be reaching a point where they realize their whole presence in China is being manipulated," said Larry Wortzel, vice-chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which was established by Congress to monitor such issues, "They're losing code and technology. The Chinese government wants Baidu to succeed."

Wortzel said that China's regular practice is to allow firms into China for the express purpose of ripping off their propriety technology and feeding it to their Chinese competitors.

"They don't have any respect for international property rights," said Wortzel, "Once they gain a technology, they use it to reverse engineer it or copy it and then take it and use it to promote a Chinese-owned company."

A huge part of the problem is that there is a lack of policy and legal mechanisms to protect both government and corporate actors in cyberspace. The U.S. response to the increasing cyber threat from China has been improving but is mostly seen as too little, too late. Leaders such as Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman James Cartwright have often called the U.S. government cyber defense effort "dysfunctional," and military leaders have admitted that gargantuan amounts of information and intelligence have been lost.

The Obama administration came into office promising to fix that problem but has faced setbacks along the way. Shortly after publishing a cyber review in May, Bush holdover cyber chief Melissa Hathaway resigned. Homeland Security cyber head Rod Beckstrom also resigned last year over a turf battle with the National Security Agency. The new cyber czar Howard Schmidt was named in late December.

To be clear, Google is not accusing the Chinese government of anything, and a spokesman would only say that they've determined the latest string of attacks "originated from within China."

But cyber security expert Alan Paller, director of research at the SANS Institute, said that attacks like the one on Google can be judged to be government-sponsored, if not government-run outright, due to their sheer sophistication, their massive scale, and the military-like efficiency with which they are carried out.

Paller said his research supports the conclusion that every foreign firm operating in China has likely been penetrated and has software on it that enables outsiders to access it at will. And while attribution of attacks is difficult to prove outright, the string of similar attacks on U.S. government and military installations dating back years shows a pattern of behavior that points directly back to Beijing.

So how do we know the Chinese are shifting those tactics to the economic sphere? One piece of evidence came to light when it was revealed the UK's domestic intelligence service MI5 sent a letter to over 300 firms warning them of state-sponsored economic cyber espionage attacks coming from China.

"That was the proof to me that the same techniques had been moved over to the economic espionage area," said Paller. [1]


[1]http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/13/china_s_expansion_of_economic_espionage_boils_over

Trade Secret Law and Economic Espionage Act of 1996(3)


Economic Espionage Act of 1996

The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (the “EEA”, now codified in 18 U.S.C. §§1831-1839) has created an important change in the law relating to the protection of trade secrets; namely, it provides for trade secret protection at the federal level. Specifically, the EEA was enacted as a federal criminal statute and, as such, it is enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice and its U.S. Attorneys’ offices located in each federal district across the country. The EEA does not provide for a private civil right of action. Accordingly, a victim of trade secret theft seeking redress must persuade the federal prosecutor in its judicial district that their particular case is worthy of prosecution.

The EEA contains two operative sections describing the conduct that is prohibited by the law. Section 1831 applies to actors engaged in foreign economic espionage, and requires that the theft of trade secrets benefit a foreign government, instrumentality or agent. Section 1832 is a general criminal trade secrets statute; applicable to anyone engaged in the common misappropriation of trade secrets. Both sections punish one who knowingly: (1) steals or misappropriates trade secrets, (2) receives misappropriated trade secrets, or (3) participates in a conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a) and 1832(a). The territorial scope of the EEA is essentially limitless: it criminalizes not only acts conducted within the United States, but also foreign acts, provided the actor is a United States resident, 18 U.S.C. § 1837(1), or any “act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1837(2).

Individuals who violate section 1832 (domestic misappropriation of trade secrets) face penalties of up to ten (10) years in prison and unspecified fines. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). (Under federal law, the general maximum fine for felonies is $250,000.) Corporations or other organizations that violate section 1832 may be fined up to $5 million. The penalties for engaging in foreign economic espionage in violation of section 1831 (foreign economic espionage) are even greater: the maximum organizational fine is increased to $10 million and the maximum prison term is raised to fifteen (15) years.[1]


[1]http://www.mccormacklegal.com/blog/trade-secret-law/trade-secret-law-and-economic-espionage-act-of-1996

Economic Espionage, From Whom & How to Prevent it? (2)



2- FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COMPETITORS

A frequent scenario is one in which an employee leaves his company and goes to work for the competitor, taking proprietary information with him.

3- THROUGH UNWITTING ACCOMPLICES

Sometimes persons who want to collect information in cyberspace through economic espionage try to find a way into opportunities in which they can collect critical information. Another poly is to create situations in cyberspace which the employees of a targeted company can be included to give their information away, in the mistaken belief that the individuals requesting the information have been properly authorized to receive it[1].

4- FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Intelligence services have professional specialists in the techniques of collecting secret information from cyberspace which they can use of their abilities for economic espionage.

5- THE INSIDER TREAT

Most of the people imagine espionage as a special agent with horrible equipment; but in reality espionage happen by an ordinary employee inside the company who approaches an outsider to sell his organization secrets.

Three surveys conducted between 1988 and 1994 by the American Society of Industrial Security determined that approximately 75 percent of all reported incident of cyberspace economic espionage were attributable to employee or former employees with access to sensitive information. The figure for losses attributable to vendors, consultants, joint venture partners and subcontractors was at that time just 15 percent, but by 1999 a similar survey identified on-site contractor employees and original equipment manufacturers as the main source of concern for U.S companies[2].

IN CONTINUE........


[1] Lewis. e. Jonathan (2008), The economic espionage act and the threat of chinese espionage in the united states
[2]Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2005(2006) published by the office of the national counterintelligence executive.



U.S Code: § 1831. Economic espionage


(a) In General.— Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly—
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Organizations.— Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10,000,000.

Economic Espionage, From Whom & How to Prevent it? (1)


Nowadays, countries information services base on new improvements in technology and globalization phenomenon have seen and understood the change from army competition to global economic competition and have prepaid the shift in their intelligence collection requirements accordingly for covering the cyberspace economic espionage that is one of the major concept in economic competition .

According to the FBI, China is currently linked to about a third of all cyberspace economic espionage cases. due to the severity of the threat the FBI increased the number o agents working on countering alleged Chinese espionage from 150 agents in 2001 to more than 350 agents as of summer 2007[1].

In other case according to japan's largest daily newspaper, Japanese authorities revealed on February 3, 1998, that Russian agents have conducted extensive industrial and cyberspace economic espionage to collect technical information during the last decade. Similar reports have appeared about the other developed country intelligence services that seeking to have access to information of other developed country industries.

Now the question is that these types of threats come from whom?
There are too many occasions that these threats come from, which in continue I am going to explain them.

1- THE OUTSIDER THREAT
Most organizations recognize that the main threat to security information of their industry as coming from outside the organization.
The main outsider threats come from company-to-company cyber attacks launched by economic competitors.

2-FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COMPETITOR

IN CONTINUE.......

[1] Lewis. e. Jonathan (2008), The economic espionage act and the threat of chinese espionage in the united states

Former Boeing Employee, Dongfan Chung, Sentenced to More than 15 Years for Economic Espionage



The Wall Street Journal is reporting that a Chinese-born engineer was sentenced Monday to more than 15 years in prison for hoarding sensitive information about the U.S. space shuttle that prosecutors say he intended to share with China.

The case against Dongfan "Greg" Chung was the U.S.'s first trial on economic-espionage charges.


The 74-year-old former Boeing Co. engineer was convicted in July of six counts of economic espionage and other federal charges for keeping 300,000 pages of sensitive papers in his home.
Before sentencing Mr. Chung, U.S. District Judge Cormac J. Carney said he didn't know exactly what information Mr. Chung passed to China. "But what I do know is what he did, and what he did pass, hurt our national security and it hurt Boeing," the judge said.

Judge Carney said Mr. Chung's scheme with the Chinese government spanned 30 years.
During brief remarks, Mr. Chung begged the judge to give him a lenient sentence. He spoke from a podium while wearing a tan prison jumpsuit with his hands cuffed to a belly chain.

"Your honor, I am not a spy, I am only an ordinary man," he said, adding that he had brought the Boeing documents home to write a book.

"Your honor, I love this country.…Your honor, I beg your pardon and let me live with my family peacefully."
Documents before the court including a letter in which Chung indicated a desire to contribute to the “motherland” and its “four modernizations” program.
(Launched by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s, the program aimed to make China a great economic power by the early 21st century, focusing on advances in the military, technology, industry and agriculture fields. Court documents said the program involved “efforts to acquire scientific information and technology from the West.”)
In getting misappropriated information to the Chinese, Chung used methods such as mail and sea freight, as well as conduits including the Chinese consulate and Chi Mak.
He also visited China on numerous occasions, lecturing on space shuttle technology, and without reporting his travel or contacts with Chinese officials to his employers.

According to the trial judgment, he was advised to use cover stories for these visits, “such as traveling to Hong Kong, visiting relatives, or accompanying his wife to an arts academy” in China.
“The trust Boeing placed in Mr. Chung to safeguard its proprietary and trade secret information obviously meant very little to Mr. Chung,” Carney said when convicting him. “He cast it aside to serve the PRC [People’s Republic of China], which he proudly proclaimed as his ‘motherland.’”


Despite Mr. Chung's age, prosecutors requested a 20-year sentence, in part to send a message to other would-be spies.

But the judge said he couldn't put a value on the amount of information that Mr. Chung stole and couldn't determine exactly how much the breaches hurt Boeing and the nation. He also cited the engineer's age and frail health in going with a sentence of 15 years and eight months.

"It's very difficult having to make a decision where someone is going to have to spend the rest of their adult life in prison," Judge Carney said. "I take no comfort or satisfaction in that."

Assistant U.S. Attorney Greg Staples noted in sentencing papers that Mr. Chung amassed a personal wealth of more than $3 million while betraying his adopted country.

"The [People's Republic of China] is bent on stealing sensitive information from the United States and shows no sign of relenting," Mr. Staples wrote. "Only strong sentences offer any hope of dissuading others from helping the PRC get that technology."

Mr. Chung's attorney, Thomas Bienert Jr., has said his client will appeal.

The government accused Mr. Chung, a stress analyst with high-level clearance, of using his 30-year career at Boeing and Rockwell International to steal the documents. They said investigators found papers stacked throughout Mr. Chung's house that included sensitive information about a booster rocket fueling system—documents that employees were ordered to lock away at the end of each day. They said Boeing invested $50 million in the technology over a five-year period.

During the nonjury trial, Mr. Chung's lawyers argued that he may have violated Boeing policy by bringing the papers home, but he didn't break any laws by doing so, and the U.S. government couldn't prove he had given secret information to China.

In his ruling, Judge Carney wrote that the notion that Mr. Chung was merely a pack rat was "ludicrous" and said the evidence showed that he had been passing information to Chinese officials as a spy.

The government believes Mr. Chung began spying for the Chinese in the late 1970s, a few years after he became a naturalized U.S. citizen and was hired by Rockwell.

Mr. Chung worked for Rockwell until it was bought by Boeing in 1996. He stayed with the company until he was laid off in 2002, then was brought back a year later as a consultant. He was fired when the FBI began its investigation in 2006.

When agents searched Mr. Chung's house that year, they discovered more than 225,000 pages of documents on Boeing-developed aerospace and defense technologies, according to trial briefs.

The technologies dealt with a phased-array antenna being developed for radar and communications on the U.S. space shuttle and a $16 million fueling mechanism for the Delta IV booster rocket, used to launch manned space vehicles.

Agents also found documents on the C-17 Globemaster troop transport used by the U.S. Air Force and militaries in Britain, Australia and Canada—but the government later dropped charges related to those finds.

Prosecutors discovered Mr. Chung's activities while investigating another suspected Chinese spy living and working in Southern California.

That man, Chi Mak, was convicted in 2007 of conspiracy to export U.S. defense technology to China. He was sentenced to 24 years in prison.


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